Indonesia must address the disproportional threat posed by small aerial drones while fulfilling its national security directives.

The war in Ukraine, currently in its second year, has involved the use of civilian unmanned aerial vehicles, or drones, for military purposes. Both the Ukrainian and Russian armies utilize these drones as a cost-effective means to conduct battlefield surveillance, command and control (C2), artillery guidance, and even serve as miniature “bombers” that drop hand grenades on enemy encampments (Thomson, 2024). The ease in which these drones can be repurposed to serve either civilian or military functions poses a pressing security challenge that cannot be ignored by Indonesia’s security apparatus (Villasenor, 2021). Failure to address this issue could leave Indonesia’s growing military vulnerable to potential threats from both state and non-state actors that may seek to contest the imbalance without having a large army of their own.

Potential Threats and Security Issues of Small Drones

There are three reasons as to why small drones have become viable battlefield weapons. First, these drones are widely available around the world and can be bought from stores or built from scratch with cheap off-the-shelf components. They require very little training and maintenance to operate and can be set up and flown without needing special infrastructure. The accessibility and affordability of drones have made them a preferred tool to conduct asymmetric warfare by guerrilla armies. In the 2014 Syrian Civil War, for example, the Islamic State terrorist group employed these drones to wreak havoc against the more modern militaries of Iraq, United States, and Russia, causing millions of dollars in losses (Warrick, 2023).

Second, the practicality of small drones have resulted in the production of new drones by defense companies to take advantage of the growing market. Larger drones, such as Turkish Aerospace’s Anka UAV, have been exported to close to a dozen countries but require the same airbase infrastructure that regular planes operate on. This has prompted U.S.-based entities such as Anduril Industries and the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) to develop miniature lethal drones that are much harder to detect and survive from in the battlefield, to be sold to the US military and its allies (Knight, 2024 & Abaire, 2024).

Third, observations made by Ukrainian General Valerii Zaluzhnyi show that small drones have played key roles in achieving air power objectives in their war against Russia, to the point that there are now counter-drone equipment being deployed for force protection (Zaluzhnyi, 2024). Chinese and Russian soldiers are now being trained with drones in mind for precision strikes by smaller squads on armored targets (Satam, 2024 & Kanal13, 2024). The U.S. is revising its military curriculum to build up drone expertise in the armed forces while also implementing trade controls on the movement of drone components across sanctioned markets (Skove, S. 2024). These examples demonstrate that countries worldwide are racing to master drone capabilities even as they are also building their conventional forces.

What Should Indonesia Do?

For Indonesia, its small defense budget of 0.7% of the GDP poses a challenge in building conventional capabilities suited to combat the threat of small drones (World Bank Open Data). President Joko Widodo has tasked the Ministry of Defense to procure new medium-sized drones and obtain technology transfers, but has yet to reach an understanding with TNI on developing a new security doctrine that incorporates the use of drones (Tarigan, 2023). In addition, smaller drones do not appear to be under discussion for purchase by security forces or deployment in sensitive operations. Nevertheless, this dilemma is not shared by terror groups who can already benefit from the rapid proliferation of small commercial drones in the domestic market.

Even with budgetary problems, there are other ways that Indonesia can adapt its fighting forces for 21^st-century warfare. The country can leverage the various drone training from bilateral training exercises to establish a specialized training program focusing on drone piloting in squad-level operations in military academies and institutions. On the supply side, it should further promote regulations that control the sale and distribution of commercial drones so as to minimize security risks. This can be in the form of licensing requirements and regular training for civilian drone operators, who can also serve as reserve trainers for future military drone training initiatives.

As it stands, Indonesia must fully harness the potential of small drones to be used as both tools and weapons. The operational use of small drones must go beyond its current use by the Army Topography Directorate to map distant areas to more forward roles. Given the risks posed by small drones flying overhead, those in the field will need support from friendly drones to continue conducting ground operations. This threat to our nation’s security is not a distant possibility, but a reality that we must confront immediately. Indonesia must act swiftly and decisively to recognize and address this potential threat before it escalates further.

Bibliography

Thompson, K. (2024, January 16). How the Drone War in Ukraine Is Transforming Conflict. Retrieved from Council on Foreign Relations.: https://www.cfr.org/article/how-drone-war-ukraine-transforming-conflict

Villasenor, J. (2011, November 11). The Drone Threat to National Security. Retrieved from Scientific American: Villasenor, J. (2011, November 11). The Drone Threat to National Security. Scientific American. https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-drone-threat-to-national-security/ ‌

Warrick, J. (2023, May 24). Use of weaponized drones by ISIS spurs terrorism fears. Retrieved from Washington Post: https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/use-of-weaponized-drones-by-isis-spurs-terrorism-fears/2017/02/21/9d83d51e-f382-11e6-8d72-263470bf0401_story.html

Knight, W. (2024, May 28). Anduril Is Building Out the Pentagon’s Dream of Deadly Drone Swarms. Retrieved from WIRED: Knight, W. (2024, May 28). Anduril Is Building Out the Pentagon’s Dream of Deadly Drone Swarms. WIRED. https://www.wired.com/story/anduril-is-building-out-the-pentagons-dream-of-deadly-drone-swarms/

Abaire, O. (2024, July 9). Darpa Builds XRQ-73 Hybrid Electric X-Plane Drone for Future War. Retrieved from Warrior Maven Center for Military Modernization: https://warriormaven.com/air/darpa-builds-xrq-73-hybrid-electric-x-plane-drone-for-future-war

Zaluzhnyi, V. (2024, February 1). Ukraine’s Army Chief: The Design of War Has Changed. Retrieved from CNN: https://www.cnn.com/2024/02/01/opinions/ukraine-army-chief-war-strategy-russia-valerii-zaluzhnyi/index.html

Satam, P. (2024, March 19). As ‘Drone Piloting’ Becomes New Military Domain, Chinese PLA Soldiers Fly FVP UAVs Through Tricky Hurdles. Retrieved from The Eurasian Times: https://www.eurasiantimes.com/plas-fpv-attack-uavs-and-redefine-the-infantry-role/

Skove, S. (2024, July 1). Across the Army, Units Lean into Drone Experimentation. Retrieved from Defense One: https://www.defenseone.com/technology/2024/05/across-army-units-lean-drone-experimentation/396934/

Data, W. B. (n.d.). World Bank Open Data. Retrieved from World Bank: https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/MS.MIL.XPND.GD.ZS?locations=ID

Tarigan, P. (2023, August 7). Indonesia Buys 12 Anka Drones from Turkey’s TAI. Retrieved from Defense News: Indonesia buys 12 Anka drones from Turkey’s TAI business. (2023, August 7). Defense News. https://www.defensenews.com/unmanned/2023/08/07/indonesia-buys-12-anka-drones-from-turkeys-tai-business/